Full Report

Figures converted from IDR to USD at historical FX rates (frankfurter.app). Monetary statements are shown in US$ millions; per-share figures use the matching period rate. Filing links open the native figures from which each USD value was derived.

The numbers behind PT Bangun Kosambi Sukses Tbk: as-reported financial statements and company metrics for FY2021–FY2025, traced to the source filings, opened with the share-price history those statements have to justify. Every linked USD figure opens the exact filing row containing the native reported value from which it was converted. Amounts in US$ millions unless noted.

Reading notes: All figures are in Rp billion, converted from the thousands of Rupiah printed in the filings; per-share amounts are in full Rupiah exactly as printed. Citation filings: FY2025 and FY2024 from the audited statements for the years ended 31 December 2025 and 2024; FY2023 income statement and cash flow from the audited statements for 2024 and 2023; FY2022 and FY2021 income statement and cash flow from the audited statements for 2022 and 2021. Balance sheet basis: FY2023, FY2024 and FY2025 are the three columns (1 January 2024, 31 December 2024 restated, 31 December 2025) printed in the FY2025 audited statements; FY2022 and FY2021 are the restated 31 December 2022 and 1 January 2022 columns printed in the FY2023 audited statements, which split customer advances between current and non-current on the same basis as later years. FY2024 comparatives were restated under the pooling-of-interests method for the January 2025 acquisition of PT Industri Pameran Nusantara (Note 25); the restated columns are used so FY2024 is comparable with FY2025.

Share Price — Available History Since January 2026

The stock closed at $0.21 on Jul 23, 2026 — down 52% over the window shown, trading between $0.18 and $0.44. At that close the stock trades at 15× FY2025 diluted EPS as reported below.

Source: market price feed, daily closes, Jan 2026–Jul 2026 — the feed marks this available history as partial. Price return only, excludes dividends. Prices converted from IDR to USD with date-matched or nearest-available FX.

FY2025 at a Glance

Source: FY2025 consolidated statements [1] [2] [3] [4]. Click any linked figure to open the filing page with the row highlighted.

Net Revenues by Type

Net Revenues by Type	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Sales of lands and buildings	8.7	36.9	126.4	139.0	145.2
Rental	0.000	0.009	0.023	0.062	2.128
Others	0.036	0.412	0.589	0.383	2.855
Net revenues	8.8	37.3	127.0	139.4	150.2
Net revenues growth, derived	—	+326.0%	+240.3%	+9.8%	+7.7%

Source: Net revenues note to the audited consolidated financial statements (Note 17 in FY2025, Note 23 in FY2024, Note 15 in FY2023 and FY2022); totals from the consolidated statements of profit or loss [5] [2] [6] [4]. Click any linked figure to open the filing page with the row highlighted.

Business Segments

Business Segments	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Real estate - net revenues	—	—	—	139.4	147.9
Convention and exhibition - net revenues	—	—	—	0.000	2.364
Net revenues - consolidated	—	—	—	139.4	150.2
Real estate - gross profit	—	—	—	75.9	99.6
Convention and exhibition - gross profit	—	—	—	0.000	(0.418)
Gross profit - consolidated	—	—	—	78.9	99.2

Source: Note 22 Operating Segment, FY2025 audited consolidated financial statements; the Group reported a single real estate segment before FY2025 [7] [2]. Click any linked figure to open the filing page with the row highlighted.

Income Statement

Source: Consolidated Statements of Profit or Loss and Other Comprehensive Income [1] [2] [3] [4]. Click any linked figure to open the filing page with the row highlighted.

Columns marked E are consensus analyst estimates from analyst consensus, shown alongside reported results for direct comparison; they are not company guidance.

Estimate source: analyst consensus (claude_web), as of 2026-07-25. Forecasts carry no filing page links.

Balance Sheet

Source: Consolidated Statements of Financial Position [8] [9] [10] [11]. Click any linked figure to open the filing page with the row highlighted.

Cash Flow

Source: Consolidated Statements of Cash Flows [12] [13] [14] [15]. Click any linked figure to open the filing page with the row highlighted.

Long-Term Record

Fiscal year	Net revenues	Gross profit	Profit for the year	Earnings per share - basic and diluted (full Rupiah)	Net cash flows generated from operating activities	Total equity
FY2021	8.8	4.3	5.3	—	(5.7)	30.3
FY2022	37.3	25.8	19.2	—	39.1	473.4
FY2023	127.0	64.1	52.3	0.01	62.8	499.8
FY2024	139.4	78.9	67.9	0.01	107.3	516.0
FY2025	150.2	99.2	88.0	0.01	43.2	718.9

Source: consolidated statements across filings; older years from the standardized feed [13] [1] [2] [8]. Click any linked figure to open the filing page with the row highlighted.

Operating KPIs

KPI	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Marketing sales - Residential	—	—	26.2	19.7	0.2
Marketing sales - Commercial products	—	—	65.1	19.1	5.0
Marketing sales - Commercial land lots	—	—	54.3	92.3	20.6
Total land reserves (hectares)	—	—	737	698	702
Total products/projects	—	—	14	13	16

Source: company-reported operating metrics [16]. Click any linked figure to open the filing page with the row highlighted.

Analyst Consensus

Street ratings: Strong Buy on minimal coverage: 1 Buy / 0 Hold / 0 Sell from 1 analyst (Investing.com, trailing 3 months). Mean = high = low = IDR 13,700, implying +278% upside vs the IDR 3,620 close on 2026-07-24 — the target is evidently stale relative to the stock's decline (52-week range 3,010-9,775). Simply Wall St explicitly states there is insufficient analyst coverage to forecast growth for CBDK; StockAnalysis shows no price target or consensus; TradingView returns null for all price-target and recommendation fields; MarketBeat, TipRanks and Zacks do not cover this Indonesian listing. Separate local broker calls not reflected in the aggregator consensus: Bahana Sekuritas Buy, TP IDR 13,100; Sucor Sekuritas Buy, TP IDR 11,000-12,000; Kiwoom Sekuritas trading buy, near-term TP IDR 3,500.

Estimate source: analyst consensus (claude_web), as of 2026-07-25. Forecasts carry no filing page links.

Traceability

328 of 335 figures on this page (98%) link to the filing page containing the native reported figure from which the USD value was converted — click a linked figure to open that source row. Unlinked figures come from standardized data feeds or pre-filing years.

• All figures are in Rp billion, converted from the thousands of Rupiah printed in the filings; per-share amounts are in full Rupiah exactly as printed.

• Citation filings: FY2025 and FY2024 from the audited statements for the years ended 31 December 2025 and 2024; FY2023 income statement and cash flow from the audited statements for 2024 and 2023; FY2022 and FY2021 income statement and cash flow from the audited statements for 2022 and 2021.

• Balance sheet basis: FY2023, FY2024 and FY2025 are the three columns (1 January 2024, 31 December 2024 restated, 31 December 2025) printed in the FY2025 audited statements; FY2022 and FY2021 are the restated 31 December 2022 and 1 January 2022 columns printed in the FY2023 audited statements, which split customer advances between current and non-current on the same basis as later years.

• FY2024 comparatives were restated under the pooling-of-interests method for the January 2025 acquisition of PT Industri Pameran Nusantara (Note 25); the restated columns are used so FY2024 is comparable with FY2025.

• The Group reported a single real estate segment through FY2024; convention and exhibition became a reported segment in FY2025 with the NICE venue, so the segment table carries FY2024 and FY2025 only.

• Earnings per share is not shown for FY2021 and FY2022: those statements were issued on a pre-IPO base of 204,082 shares and are not comparable with the 5,102,050,000 and 5,668,944,500 share bases of later years. FY2023 EPS of 113.40 is the comparative printed in the FY2024 statements on the 5,102,050,000 share basis.

• No comparable history exists before FY2021: the standalone FY2021 audited report covers a much smaller consolidation perimeter than the restated FY2021 columns used here, so FY2020 is omitted rather than shown on an incompatible basis.

• Figures shown without a link are printed as a dash (nil) in the source statement, or are lines the filing did not present in that year.

• Quarterly cells for Q2-Q4 FY25 are derived by differencing the printed cumulative six-month, nine-month and full-year columns; each such citation carries the printed year-to-date anchor it was derived from. Q1 FY25 and Q1 FY26 are printed three-month columns.

• Q1 FY25 investing and financing cash flow are cited to the Q1 FY2025 filing as printed; the Q1 FY2026 filing restates the same period with a Rp 99,000 thousand reclassification of the acquisition of a subsidiary between those two subtotals.

• data/financials/income.json is absent for this run (no provider returned an income statement), so every income-statement figure is taken from the filings. Balance sheet and cash flow figures agree with data/financials/*.json.

• 7 figure(s) differed between the data feed and the filing; the filing value is shown (see the run's metrics/metrics_tab.json for the audit trail).

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PT Bangun Kosambi Sukses Tbk's management explains the business in its own materials. The slides below do the most of that work, pulled from the documents preserved in Sources. Each source link opens the complete presentation at that slide in a new tab.

Company Presentation - January 2026 — Jan 2026

The current corporate deck: what CBDK owns, who controls it, how the landbank and the new convention centre fit together, with 9M25 numbers. · Open the full document →

Company Presentation - May 2025 — May 2025

The fuller post-IPO deck: units sold and handover schedules by project, the NICE build case, and the only peer table management publishes. · Open the full document →

More from management

Company Presentation - February 2025 — Feb 2025 · 23 pages · Full-year 2024 marketing sales of IDR 2.1tn against a IDR 2.6tn target, plus 2021-2024 balance sheet and income statement charts. · Open →

Company Presentation - January 2025 (IPO) — Jan 2025 · 23 pages · The deck CBDK listed on: a 735 ha landbank, 9M24 financials and the project portfolio as pitched to IPO buyers. · Open →

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PT Bangun Kosambi Sukses Tbk's annual reports contain management's most considered account of the business. These are the sections, passages and visual pages worth opening in the originals preserved in Sources.

PT Bangun Kosambi Sukses Tbk — 2025 Annual and Sustainability Report — FY2025

First full year as a listed company: three reported segments where there was one, and the IPO proceeds spent on an affiliate. · Open the full document →

Bidang Usaha / Business Lines — p. 64 · Read the full section →

The chartered scope and the actual FY2025 activity, plus the map of which product sits in which legal entity.

What the company actually did in 2025, in its own words.

In 2025, the Company operated in the residential and commercial real estate development sector, encompassing the purchase, sale, leasing, and operation of real estate properties, whether owned or leased, residential buildings, and non-residential properties (such as warehouses, malls, and shopping centers), as well as the provision of houses and apartments, furnished or unfurnished, for permanent or long-term use on a monthly or yearly basis. The Company’s activities also cover land sales, property development for self-operation (leasing of building spaces), land subdivision into plots without land development, and operation of residential areas for movable or modular homes. Business activities of the Company’s subsidiaries include convention and hotel exhibition.

p. 64 · Read in context →

Entitas Anak, Entitas Asosiasi, dan Ventura Bersama / Subsidiaries, Associates, and Joint Ventures — p. 89 · Read the full section →

Ownership chart plus a status column showing four of seven subsidiaries were still not operating at year-end.

Tinjauan Operasi per Segmen Usaha / Review of Operations by Business Segment — p. 100 · Read the full section →

Where the economics live: three product groups with stated price bands, and gross margins that differ by 40+ points.

The business model as management defines it, with price ranges per product group.

The Company and its subsidiaries focus on developing integrated real estate–based township areas, covering a wide range of activities from construction and area development to the management and marketing of residential and commercial properties. The Company’s primary development area is located in the strategic PIK2 district, Tangerang, which is recognized as one of the highest-growth and highest-value property zones in the Greater Jakarta (Jabodetabek) region. […] The Company’s business model is divided into three main product groups: […] Residential products include the development of landed housing targeted at the middle-to-upper market segments, including projects such as Permata Hijau Residences, Manhattan Residences, and Rumah Milenial. These housing units are marketed at price ranges starting from IDR 1.5 billion to IDR 16 billion per unit […] Selling prices vary from IDR 3.2 billion to IDR 18 billion per unit depending on size and location. […] In addition, the Company develops and markets commercial land plots for investors and business operators who require flexibility in designing their buildings and spatial functions.

p. 100 · Read in context →

Segmen Konvensi dan Pameran / Convention and Exhibition Segment — p. 103 · Read the full section →

The two new segments added in 2025 — NICE, which began earning, and the hotel, which has not.

NICE: stated capacity and the 14 events held in its first year.

In 2025, the Company began developing and operating the convention and exhibition segment (MICE) as part of its business diversification strategy and eforts to enhance the value of the township. The main facility developed in this segment is the Nusantara International Convention and Exhibition (NICE), designed to become one of the largest and most representative convention centers in North Tangerang, particularly within the PIK2 area. […] NICE has an efective capacity to accommodate more than 100,000 visitors simultaneously, with flexible room configuration options for various event scales, ranging from trade exhibitions, product launches, international conferences, to community-based events. […] Throughout 2025, the convention and exhibition segment recorded positive developments. A total of 14 events were successfully held

p. 103 · Read in context →

Hotel segment (p.106): Hilton PIK2, 271 rooms, opening 2027, no revenue recorded yet.

In 2025, the Company formally expanded its business portfolio into the hospitality industry segment through a strategic agreement with the global hotel network PT Hilton International Manage Indonesia and Hilton Worldwide Manage Limited. This partnership introduces an international five-star hotel project, Hilton Hotel PIK2, developed within the prestigious NICE district at PIK2. […] The hotel is designed to rise 20 floors high and provide a total of 271 exclusive rooms […] The hotel is scheduled to open in 2027. […] As of the end of 2025, Hilton Hotel PIK2 is still under ongoing development, therefore the hotel segment has not yet recorded any contribution to the Company’s Revenue.

p. 106 · Read in context →

Laporan Laba Rugi Konsolidasian / Consolidated Statement of Profit or Loss — p. 109 · Read the full section →

Management explains why gross profit rose 30% on 11% revenue growth: mix, not price.

Cost of revenue fell while revenue rose — management attributes both to the land-plot mix.

The Company’s cost of revenue was recorded at IDR 850.04 billion in 2025, a decrease of IDR 126.58 billion or approximately 12.96% compared to the 2024 position of IDR 976.61 billion. This decline was mainly due to the fact that the volume of deliveries throughout 2024 was dominated by the commercial land segment, which recorded a lower cost of revenue than the other segments, namely residential and commercial products. […] The Company’s gross profit for 2025 was recorded at IDR 1.65 trillion, an increase of IDR 381.24 billion or 29.96% from the previous year’s figure of IDR 1.27 trillion. This performance was driven by the commercial land segment, which generated a higher gross profit margin than the residential and commercial product segments.

p. 110 · Read in context →

Perbandingan Target dengan Realisasi Tahun 2025, serta Proyeksi 2026 / Comparison of Targets with 2025 Realization and 2026 Projections — p. 120 · Read the full section →

Marketing sales came in at 84.67% of target, with residential at 36.76%; the 2026 residential target is 31x the 2025 result.

Informasi Material Terkait Investasi, Ekspansi, Divestasi, Merger, Akuisisi, dan Restrukturisasi Utang / Material Information Related to Investment, Expansion, Divestment, Merger, Acquisition, and Debt Restructuring — p. 128 · Read the full section →

The whole IPO net proceeds, Rp2.30 trillion, went to acquire an affiliate held by the same controlling shareholders.

Management's stated rationale for buying the MICE entity from affiliated parties.

The Company’s decision to invest in PT IPN was based on the fact that the MICE project development has been carried out by PT IPN, which was established to focus on the development of the MICE business. […] After considering the background of the Transaction, the Company is confident that conducting the Transaction with an afiliated party allows the implementation process to be carried out more eficiently and with competitive pricing compared to if the Transaction were conducted with another unafiliated party.

p. 129 · Read in context →

Hal Audit Utama — Pengakuan Pendapatan / Key Audit Matters — Revenue Recognition — p. 346 · Read the full section →

The auditor's own account of the judgment that sets when a sale becomes revenue: handover, not contract.

Point-in-time recognition on transfer of control — the policy that shapes reported revenue timing.

The Group's revenues mainly comprise of real estate revenue through sales of land plots, residential houses and office houses. Measurement and recognition of revenues, and related policies and procedures are significant to our audit because the revenue is material to the Consolidated Financial Statements and the Group's revenue recognition required the management to apply significant judgment, especially in determining revenue recognition at a point in time based on point in time transfer of the control of the asset (at a point in time satisfaction of performance obligation). […] Revenue from the sale of inventories is recognized at a point in time when inventories are delivered to the customers. The timing of revenue recognition requires judgment on whether the Group has transferred significant risks and rewards of ownership in the inventories to the customers and whether the Group has a substantial continuing involvement with the inventories.

p. 346 · Read in context →

Catatan 21. Saldo dan Transaksi Material dengan Pihak Berelasi / Note 21. Material Balances and Transactions with Related Parties — p. 412 · Read the full section →

Scale of the affiliate web: 16.60% of restated FY2024 revenue was to related parties, and Rp538bn of customer advances still are.

PT Bangun Kosambi Sukses Tbk — 2024 Annual Report — FY2024

The last pre-IPO edition: a business described as real estate only, reported as one segment in one geography. · Open the full document →

Catatan 27. Segmen Operasi / Note 27. Operating Segment — p. 260 · Read the full section →

One sentence that FY2025 Note 22 replaces with a four-column table — the segment redefinition in the original.

FY2024: a single segment, a single geography.

Management managed and categorised Group into one segment, which is real estate. […] All of the Group’s sales are in the same geographic area which is Tangerang.

p. 260 · Read in context →

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Competitors describe PT Bangun Kosambi Sukses Tbk's market in their own filings and calls. These verified passages and visual pages show where their strategies meet, using source documents preserved in Sources.

PT Bumi Serpong Damai Tbk (BSD City, Sinar Mas Land) (BSDE)

Named in CBDK's own prospectus as a competitor and the closest structural analogue to PIK2: a self-contained mega-township with its own CBD in Tangerang, selling landed homes, shophouses, apartments and commercial land to the same Greater Jakarta middle-upper buyer, and monetising land through joint ventures the same way CBDK does.

BSD City's scorecard for 2025: marketing sales hit the headline target, but only because land sales to joint ventures filled a large shortfall in both residential and commercial pre-sales, and profit came in at roughly half of plan.

This year, the Company has successfully exceeded the marketing sales target set at the beginning of the year. The marketing sales achievement this year was IDR10.04 trillion or 100.4% compared to the 2025 target of IDR10 trillion. Residential marketing sales in 2025 were IDR4.19 trillion, or 82% of the IDR5.1 trillion target. Commercial marketing sales were IDR3.73 trillion or 76% of the target. Meanwhile, others also served as a significant contributor, amounting to IDR2.13 trillion or 21% of total 2025 marketing sales. The Company also managed to record Revenues of IDR12.79 trillion, 92,65% of the initial target set IDR13.80 trillion. In line with that, the Company’s Profit for the Year was recorded at IDR2.86 trillion or 48.39% of the initial target set at IDR5.90 trillion.

p. 161 · Read in context →

BSD City's board sets a flat Rp10tn pre-sales target for 2026 and describes the market it shares with PIK2 as a moderate recovery rather than an expansion — its stated view, not a forecast for the sector.

Additional challenges are anticipated within the investment sector. Property investment growth is expected to be moderate rather than expansive, highlighting the necessity for product differentiation and cost efficiency strategies, which will be crucial elements in property-related decision-making. […] According to various surveys and analyses conducted by industry experts and property consultants, the national property sector is projected to enter a recovery phase characterized by moderate growth, with varying rates across different sub-sectors. […] Considering the potential and challenges derived from the gathered data and information, the Directors with the approval of the BOC, have established a moderate marketing sales target of IDR10.00 trillion, while continuing to emphasize development in the residential sector at 50%. This target enables the Company to cultivate sustainable competitiveness grounded in prudent principles and strong risk management.

p. 23 · Read in context →

BSD City attributes its market position to township credibility, partner joint ventures and design, and discloses the unit mix behind Rp10tn of pre-sales — 1,331 residential units, 221 apartments and 547 shophouses, the same product set CBDK sells in the PIK2 CBD.

The increasingly trusted of sustainable development in the area, combined with collaboration with strategic partners, innovative funding and consistently attractive and up-to-date design concepts, have effectively strengthen the Company’s position and market share within the industry. This year, the Company reported marketing sales totaling IDR10.04 trillion. In the residential segment, marketing sales reached IDR4.19 trillion, derived from 1,331 units across all the Company’s townships, including the Rancamaya area. Additionally, commercial marketing sales reached IDR3.73 trillion, generated from the sales of 221 apartment units and 547 shophouse units. Furthermore, land sales to joint venture companies achieved a significant value of IDR2.13 trillion.

p. 126 · Read in context →

PT Alam Sutera Realty Tbk (ASRI)

The other large-scale mixed township developer in Tangerang/Banten — CBDK's exact home market — selling landed houses, shophouses and commercial product to middle- and upper-income buyers. Its 2025 shortfall is the closest available read on how that specific catchment absorbed supply.

Alam Sutera's board reports a 30% miss against its own 2025 marketing-sales target in the Tangerang market, and attributes part of it to a longer sales cycle now that buyers are mostly end users rather than investors.

In 2025, the Company recorded marketing sales of Rp2.44 trillion, achieving 70% of the initial target set at Rp3.5 trillion. Residential product sales (including apartments) contributed significantly, accounting for 70% of this year’s marketing sales, while the 30% was generated from commercial product sales. On the revenue front, the Company recorded realized revenues of Rp2.9 trillion, which was lower than the initial target of Rp3.4–3.5 trillion set at the beginning of the year. […] From an operational perspective, the Company faced several challenges, including a longer sales cycle due to the current consumer profile being dominated by end users, increased construction costs resulting from rising prices of building materials, and dynamic shifts in consumer preferences.

p. 37 · Read in context →

Alam Sutera's stated 2026 outlook: the upper-middle residential segment above Rp1.5bn is where it sees growth, while apartments, offices and hospitality stay constrained — the split matters because CBDK's mix spans both sides of it.

The Ministry of Finance has stated that the projected improvement in economic growth in 2026 is expected to serve as a positive catalyst for business activity and property market performance. Within the commercial property segment, the apartment and office sub-segments are anticipated to experience limited growth. The hospitality sector also faces potential continued pressure stemming from ongoing efficiency-driven policies. Residential property, however, is projected to record solid growth, with the upper-middle segment, comprising properties priced above Rp1.5 billion, having recorded increased sales in 2025 and projected to sustain growth into 2026.

p. 113 · Read in context →

How Alam Sutera frames competitive risk in its formal risk register: not only rival developers but the volume of supply reaching the market — the oversupply channel a single-township developer is most exposed to.

Risiko Persaingan / Competitive Risk […] The competitive risks faced by the property industry consist of two types of risks: competitors in the same industry and the market supply. […] In facing these challenges, the Company continues to strive to provide various innovative offerings that prioritize originality, uniqueness, and high-quality products, supported by excellent service and comprehensive supporting facilities tailored to customer needs. The Company is also committed to timely product delivery.

p. 158 · Read in context →

PT Lippo Karawaci Tbk (LPKR)

Developer of Lippo Village in Tangerang, the other established large-scale integrated township in the same west corridor, and the only peer in this set that also runs a hotel-plus-MICE business — the segment CBDK operates alongside its real estate through its convention and exhibition assets.

Lippo Karawaci's explicit statement of who it competes with and on what axes — other large developers, judged on location, supporting infrastructure, services and price — plus the strengths it claims in response.

The broad segmentation of the national property industry is influenced by various factors, including the growing and expanding presence of smaller regional competitors. Meanwhile, the Company’s competitors primarily consist of other major property developers, especially in terms of development locations, supporting facilities and infrastructure, available services, and pricing. Despite intensifying competition, the Company remains committed to strengthening its competitiveness by leveraging its core strengths in the Real Estate Development business in Indonesia, including its extensive land bank, well-established infrastructure, innovative products, strong reputation, proven track record, experience, and competitive financing options.

p. 118 · Read in context →

Lippo Karawaci's industry review describes a contraction in MICE demand driven by government budget tightening, alongside falling star-hotel occupancy — the demand pool CBDK's convention, exhibition and hotel segment draws on.

The national hospitality industry faced significant challenges and volatility throughout 2025. Overall, sector revenue declined, with a number of hotels reporting year-on-year decreases in both occupancy and income. As of February 2025, the average occupancy rate of star-rated hotels fell to 47.21%, compared with 49.45% in the same period of the previous year. […] This downward trend is further compounded by a contraction in demand for MICE (Meeting, Incentive, Convention, Exhibition) services, particularly from the government sector, which implemented budget tightening for business travel and events. At the same time, hotels are experiencing margin pressure due to rising costs—namely labor and utilities—combined with subdued demand.

p. 98 · Read in context →

The scale of a mature Tangerang township after three decades — unit count, resident population and the facility stack — set against group pre-sales that fell to Rp5.32tn in 2025 from Rp6.01tn.

As of 2025, Lippo Village comprises 14,765 property units developed in accordance with the LV Building Code & Control and is home to 69,447 residents. This integrated township is further supported by comprehensive facilities that address residents’ daily needs across health, recreation, and worship. These include 1,430 shop houses, 2 malls, 1 university, 11 schools, 1 hospital, 5 places of worship, 3 office buildings, 1 golf course, 1 five-star hotel, and 4 culinary complexes. […] Throughout 2025, LippoLand generated pre-sales of Rp5,32 trillion, a decrease from Rp6.01 trillion in the previous year. […] LippoLand during the same period successfully sold 6,047 property units.

p. 102 · Read in context →

PT Pakuwon Jati Tbk (PWON)

Named in CBDK's prospectus and the listed benchmark for the format CBDK is building in the PIK2 CBD — superblocks combining malls, offices, hotels and condominiums, run for recurring income. Pakuwon's centre of gravity is Surabaya, so the overlap is in business model and Jakarta commercial assets rather than geography.

Pakuwon explains a jump in the share of pre-sales above Rp5bn per unit as upgraders and repeat buyers trading up inside an established superblock — the ecosystem effect a mature mixed-use estate can lean on.

The higher contribution from units above IDR 5 billion is mainly driven by upgrader and repeat buyers from the Eluna Tower launch (Kota Kasablanka phase 4). Existing customers are moving into higher-value products within the same ecosystem, reflecting strong brand loyalty and confidence in the project. This trend supports a shift toward higher-value products, reinforcing both pricing power and margin quality.

p. 25 · Read in context →

More peer documents

LPKR_annual_report_FY2024 — 296 pages · Prior-year Lippo Karawaci report with a longer 'Persaingan Usaha' section (pp.141-142) and separate MICE and market-share discussion — useful for a year-over-year read on how the same competitor describes the field. · Open →

ASRI_annual_report_FY2024 — 331 pages · Alam Sutera's FY2024 report states an explicit intent to grow market share via a wider price-range portfolio (p.111) and gives the pre-downturn Tangerang baseline against which the 2025 miss can be measured. · Open →

Q3_FY2025 — 65 pages · Ciputra's 9M25 deck — the quarter in which the FY25 target was cut — gives the intra-year sequence of the demand slowdown that the full-year deck only summarises. · Open →

Q2_FY2025 — 65 pages · Ciputra's 6M25 deck carries the same country-overview pack (mortgage penetration, RPPI, urbanisation) at an earlier date, useful for checking how stable those market-sizing slides are quarter to quarter. · Open →

Q4_FY2025 — 41 pages · Pakuwon's full-year 2025 deck with the FY presales mix, mall occupancy by asset and the land-bank table at 521.7 ha — the annual counterpart to the 1Q26 figures used above. · Open →

Q2_FY2025 — 44 pages · Mid-2025 Pakuwon deck covering the Bekasi and Batam expansions and the retail portfolio, for tracking how a recurring-income operator paces new superblock capital commitments. · Open →

Q1_FY2026 — 67 pages · Beyond the exhibits used, pp.36-45 detail Ciputra's 2026 project launches including AeroWorld 8, an 'Airport Central Business District and Living' scheme mapped adjacent to Pantai Indah Kapuk. · Open →

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Figures converted from Indonesian rupiah at historical FX rates — see data/company.json.fx_rates. Ratios, margins, and multiples are unitless and unchanged.

Bottom line

CBDK sells serviced land inside one 700-hectare estate west of Jakarta, collects the money up front, and books it as revenue years later on handover. That mechanism produced $82 million of FY2025 profit to shareholders on a 66% gross margin. It also means FY2025 order intake of $26 million — down 80% year on year in the company's own operational table — has not yet touched reported earnings.

One estate, one controlling owner

PT Bangun Kosambi Sukses Tbk develops the central business district of PIK 2, a coastal township in Tangerang, Banten, roughly 25 km west of central Jakarta. Its inventory is not a portfolio of projects across a country; it is 702 hectares of land reserves in one place, sold plot by plot and building by building across 16 products at the end of 2025 [1]. Everything in the investment case traces back to that single land position and to who controls it.

Control is concentrated to an unusual degree. PT Pantai Indah Kapuk Dua Tbk (PANI) held 87.27% of the shares at the end of 2025, up from 51.00% a year earlier as the two founding vehicles — PT Agung Sedayu and PT Tunas Mekar Jaya — folded their stakes into the listed parent and were left with 1.37% each. The public holds exactly 10.00%, the IDX minimum. No director or commissioner owns shares directly; the annual report names President Commissioner Richard Halim Kusuma as the ultimate beneficial owner [2].

The company listed on 13 January 2025 at $0.252 per share, with 5,668,944,500 shares outstanding and a market capitalisation of $1,427 million on the day [3]. Three days later it spent IPO proceeds acquiring 99.90% of PT Industri Pameran Nusantara, operator of the NICE convention centre, and in March 2025 added PT Citra Kirana Bisnis Distrik, developer of the Hilton PIK2 hotel due to open in 2027 [4].

Sources: market cap derived from 5,668,944,500 shares [5] at the $0.211 close of 23 July 2026 (market data, as reported); revenue and profit from the FY2025 Financial Highlights [6]; net cash derived from cash of $187m [7] less bank loans of $15m [8].

Cash first, revenue years later

The accounting mechanism matters more here than at most developers, and the company states it plainly: because most sales are made on an indent (pre-order) basis, CBDK recognises almost no trade receivables. Money received before the performance obligation is fulfilled sits on the liability side as advances from customers, and becomes revenue only when control of the unit or plot passes to the buyer [9].

That pool is the largest single item on the balance sheet after land. Advances from customers stood at $573 million at 31 December 2025 ($505m current plus $68m non-current), against $616 million a year earlier and $565 million at 1 January 2024 [10]. It is 42% of the $1,355 million balance sheet and nearly four times FY2025 revenue.

Sources: advances from customers at 1 Jan 2024, 31 Dec 2024 and 31 Dec 2025 [11]; net revenues from the FY2025 Financial Highlights [12].

Two features of that chart carry the business model. First, the pool is very large relative to the income statement, so reported revenue in any year is mostly a release of cash collected in earlier years rather than a measure of current selling. Second, 2025 is the first year the pool shrank — by $23 million at the 2025 rate — meaning recognition ran ahead of fresh collections for the first time in the reported record.

The land behind it is carried at the lower of cost and net realisable value. Inventories totalled $829 million at end-2025 ($415m current, $415m non-current) [13], 61% of assets, spread across the 702-hectare reserve [14]. Historic-cost land meeting central-business-district pricing is the whole of the margin story: cost of revenues was $51 million against $150 million of sales in FY2025 [15].

Three years of reported numbers

On the reported line, the trajectory is uninterrupted improvement. Revenue rose from $127 million in 2023 to $150 million in 2025; gross margin widened from 50.5% to 66.1%; profit attributable to owners of the parent more than doubled, from $38 million to $82 million; earnings per share went from $0.0074 to $0.0145 [16] [17].

Source: FY2025 Annual Report, Financial Highlights and Financial Ratios [18] [19].

The first quarter of 2026 extended the pattern sharply. Net revenue of $45 million was 74% above the $26 million of Q1 2025, and gross profit of $37 million implies an 82.9% gross margin [20]. Profit attributable to owners of the parent was $32 million against $8 million a year earlier [21].

Two details inside that quarter are worth carrying forward. The real-estate segment earned $39 million of gross profit on $44 million of revenue — an 88% margin — while the convention and exhibition segment, the recurring-income pivot management describes, produced $0.3 million of revenue against $2.4 million of cost, a gross loss of $2.0 million [22]. And two buyers accounted for $31 million, or 70% of quarterly revenue: PT Global Jet Express at $16 million and PT Erajaya Swasembada Tbk at $15 million, against nil in the comparative quarter [23]. For FY2025 as a whole, the audited note states no single customer exceeded 10% of consolidated revenue [24]. Quarterly earnings at this company are lumpy because a single corporate land purchase can be most of a quarter.

Order intake fell while profit rose

The forward-looking series moves the other way. The FY2025 annual report's operational highlights table, stated consistently in rupiah across three years, shows total marketing sales of $146 million in 2023, $131 million in 2024 and $26 million in 2025 — a 79.7% decline in the latest year. Commercial land plots, the largest line, fell from $92 million to $21 million; commercial products from $19 million to $5 million; residential from $20 million to $0.2 million [25].

Sources: marketing sales by segment, FY2025 Operational Highlights [26]; net revenues, FY2025 Financial Highlights [27].

The company's own target moved with it, and the two annual reports do not reconcile. Writing in the FY2024 report, management set a 2025 pre-sales target of $126 million, to be supported by four subsidiaries [28]. The FY2025 report presents the 2025 target as $30 million and the outcome as $26 million, or 84.67% of target [29]. Neither report reconciles the roughly 75% reduction between the two filings: the FY2025 report describes its $30 million target as "a conservative yet realistic approach to maintain growth sustainability amid global economic uncertainty", without reference to the $126 million published a year earlier [30]. The 2026 target is $34 million, 30.9% above the 2025 outcome and around a quarter of what 2024 actually delivered [31].

The strongest fact against reading this as demand failure is the FY2024 base itself. The FY2024 report describes 2024 pre-sales of $131 million, of which $92 million was commercial land plots, up 78% from $54 million in 2023 [32]. A book of that size, sold indent and recognised on handover, funds several years of revenue on its own — which is precisely what the $573 million advances pool represents. Weak intake in 2025 therefore does not have to show up in 2026 or 2027 earnings, and Q1 2026 shows it has not. What it does is set the pace at which the pool empties.

What the shares have done

The reception at listing was enthusiastic and did not last. The shares opened at $0.252, touched $0.710 within the first quarter — 2.8 times the offer price — and closed 2025 at $0.525, valuing the company at $2,976 million [33]. They then fell through 2026 to $0.211 on 23 July, roughly 57% below the 2025 close and 7% below the $1,427 million capitalisation at which the company listed [34]. Reported earnings accelerated the whole way down.

Sources: IPO price and 2025 quarterly closes, FY2025 Share Highlights and Corporate Actions [35] [36]; 2026 quarter-end and latest closes from market data, as reported.

At $0.211 the arithmetic is compact. Market capitalisation is $1,194 million. Trailing twelve-month profit to the parent — FY2025 less Q1 2025 plus Q1 2026 — is $107 million, putting the shares on about 12 times trailing earnings. Equity attributable to owners of the parent was $542 million at end-2025 [37], so the market pays roughly 2.4 times book — book that carries the land at historic cost. Net cash of $172 million is 13% of the market value. The dividend distributed in 2025 was $0.0003 per share, $1.7 million in total, or 3.06% of FY2024 profit [38].

Balance-sheet risk is low by the standards of Indonesian property. Interest-bearing bank debt was $15 million at end-2025 against $187 million of cash [39] [40]. The claim ahead of shareholders is not a lender; it is the $573 million owed to buyers in the form of units and plots not yet delivered.

What this report examines

Setting the spine for what follows: the question this report exists to answer is whether CBDK's reported profits — released from a $573 million pool of customer money collected in earlier years against land carried at historic cost — can be replenished by new sales at anything like the rate they are being consumed, and what price that answer supports after the shares gave back everything they gained since listing.

The evidence so far points both ways, and honestly so. In favour of the business: 66% gross margins in FY2025 rising to 83% in Q1 2026, net cash, minimal debt, a land position in one of the few large master-planned districts within reach of Jakarta, and a controlling owner with the balance sheet to keep building. Against it: order intake down 80% in a year, a 2025 target cut roughly 75% between two consecutive annual reports without explanation, a 10% free float, a convention business currently loss-making at the gross line, and 70% of the most recent quarter's revenue from two corporate buyers.

What would settle it is observable and dated. If marketing sales in 2026 land near the $34 million target while the advances pool keeps falling, the pool is being drawn down rather than refilled, and the current earnings run-rate is temporary. If intake instead returns toward the $130 million range that 2023 and 2024 delivered, the 2025 figure was a pause. The 2026 full-year operational highlights table, published in the FY2026 annual report and previewed in quarterly disclosure, is where that reads out.

One limitation to state plainly: web research was unavailable for this run, so nothing here rests on press coverage, broker estimates, or the regulatory debate around the PIK 2 area. Every figure above comes from CBDK's own filings and market price data.

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Figures converted from Indonesian rupiah at historical FX rates — see data/company.json.fx_rates. Ratios, margins, and multiples are unitless and unchanged.

Bottom line

CBDK's cash flow statement crossed over in 2025. Cash received from customers fell to $140 million from $203 million while recognised revenue rose to $150 million [1] — the first year the company booked more revenue than it collected [2]. In the March 2026 quarter the gap widened and operating cash flow turned negative, at minus $7 million against $31 million of reported profit [3].

Cash in, revenue out

The reported profit and loss account for 2023 to 2025 is a clean upward line, and the orientation chapter sets it out. The cash flow statement tells a different story, and it is the more informative of the two for a business that collects money years before it recognises revenue.

Because CBDK sells on an indent basis, the cash flow line "receipt from customers" is close to a direct measure of commercial activity in the period: it is money physically arriving from buyers, whether against a plot sold last month or an instalment on one sold three years ago. Recognised revenue, by contrast, is the release of earlier collections onto the income statement when a unit is handed over. The difference between the two is the direction the advances pool is travelling.

Sources: FY2025 receipts and the FY2024 restated comparative from the FY2025 consolidated cash flow statement [4]; FY2023 receipts from the audited FY2023 statements [5]; revenue from the FY2025 Financial Highlights [6].

In 2023 the company took in $75 million more from customers than it recognised. In 2024, $64 million more. In 2025 the sign flipped: $11 million less [7] [8] [9]. The balance sheet agrees: advances from customers fell to $573 million at end-2025 from $616 million a year earlier [10].

The March 2026 quarter extends the trend rather than breaking it. Revenue of $42 million was 74% higher year on year and gross profit rose 159% [11], and profit attributable to shareholders rose to $30 million from $8 million, an EPS of $0.0054 against $0.0014 [12]. Cash received from customers in the same three months was $16 million, down from $51 million a year earlier [13]. The $26 million shortfall against recognised revenue is almost exactly the $26 million by which the advances pool shrank in the quarter, to $509 million [14]. The two statements are describing the same event from opposite sides.

Profit converted to cash

Source: derived from operating cash flow of $62.8M, $107.3M and $43.2M and profit for the year of $52.3M, $67.9M and $88.0M, FY2023–FY2025 [15] [16], and from Q1 2026 operating cash flow of minus $7.3M against profit of $30.6M [17] [18].

For two years operating cash flow ran ahead of accounting profit — 120% of it in 2023, 158% in 2024. In 2025 it covered 49%. In the March 2026 quarter it covered none of it [19] [20]. That pattern is what a pre-collected order book looks like when it is being drawn down faster than it is being refilled; it is not, on this evidence, a receivables or a working-capital problem, since CBDK carries almost no trade receivables at all [21].

Sources: FY2024 and FY2025 from the consolidated cash flow statement [22] and the three-year summary [23]; FY2023 from the audited FY2023 statements [24]; Q1 2026 from the interim statements [25].

One comparability note the table cannot show. The FY2024 column was restated during 2025 when CBDK acquired PT Industri Pameran Nusantara from an entity under common control and applied pooling-of-interests accounting, which the auditor flagged in an emphasis-of-matter paragraph [26]. The restatement added $74 million to end-2024 total assets, matched almost exactly by additional liabilities of $74 million, and left revenue and earnings per share unchanged [27]. The FY2023 column was not restated — the visible tell is that closing cash for 2023 is $18.7 million while opening cash for 2024 is $19.1 million, the $0.4 million difference being the acquired entity's cash [28].

Management's explanation

The FY2025 management discussion attributes the 58.43% fall in operating cash flow to one cause: an increase in payments to suppliers of $13.7 million, or 17.59% [29]. That figure is accurate and it is the right sign, but it accounts for roughly a fifth of the decline. Cash generated from operations before interest and tax fell $72 million, from $109 million to $38 million, and $57 million of that — four-fifths — came from the drop in receipts from customers, which the cash flow discussion does not mention [30] [31]. The number a reader needs is in the statements; it is not in the narrative that explains them.

Where the money went

Cash fell $21 million during 2025 even after $138 million of IPO proceeds arrived, because $127 million went out through investing [32] [33]. Against the property spend, 2025 was the first year of negative free cash flow in the record: $43 million of operating cash flow, less $69 million of investment-property purchases and $10 million of fixed assets, is minus $36 million. The March quarter added another minus $14 million on the same basis [34] [35].

Most of that spending is the MICE and hospitality build-out: investment property additions of $103 million in 2025, with the entire $155 million of assets under construction transferred into completed buildings during the year, taking net investment property to $154 million [36]. One item is different in kind. On 21 October 2025 CBDK placed $51 million, in two equal tranches, into long-term bonds issued by PT Danantara Investment Management (Persero), described in the notes as "Patriot Bond" Series A and Series B, carrying interest of 2% per annum and maturing in October 2030 and October 2032 [37]. That is 37% of net IPO proceeds committed for five and seven years at 2%, by a company whose own bank facilities cost between 6.50% and 9.00% [38]. The bonds are carried at amortised cost equal to nominal value, and the fair-value note states that the fair value of the Group's financial assets approximates carrying value "as the effect of discounting is not material" — a statement that now covers a five-to-seven-year instrument yielding a third of what the company pays its own banks [39] [40]. Discounted at 6.5% — the lowest rate CBDK itself pays, and so the most generous assumption available from its own filings — the two tranches are worth in the region of $40 million rather than $51 million. That is my arithmetic, not a company disclosure; the filings offer no separate valuation of the instrument.

A second, quieter drain sits in current assets. Prepaid taxes reached $61 million at end-2025, from $54 million and $46 million in the two prior years, of which $46 million is unrecovered value-added tax [41]. At 31 March 2026 the balance was $57 million [42]. That is cash already paid to the tax authority, equal to 69% of FY2025 group profit, sitting on the balance sheet pending refund or offset, and it has grown every year in the record.

Whose profit it is

Group profit and profit attributable to shareholders have moved at different speeds, and the gap is not small. Between 2023 and 2025 profit for the year rose $40 million, from $52 million to $88 million. Profit attributable to owners of the parent rose $47 million, from $38 million to $82 million, because the parent's share of group profit went from 71.9% to 93.0% as non-controlling interests fell from $15 million to $6 million [43]. Held at the 2023 share, FY2025 profit to shareholders would have been about $63 million. On that arithmetic roughly $19 million — 39% of the two-year increase in shareholder profit, and $0.0033 of the $0.0071 increase in EPS — came from owning more of the same group rather than from the group earning more. What CBDK paid the sellers, and to whom, is a separate question the filings answer only in part; it belongs in a chapter of its own.

What "net cash" does and does not cover

For a reader whose first screen is solvency, the headline numbers are reassuring and mostly earned. Borrowings were $15 million at end-2025 against $187 million of cash, so net cash of $172 million and a gearing ratio the company reports as nil [44]. Interest cover is 50 times, and management states plainly that as of end-2025 no financial-ratio covenants applied under any of its loan agreements [45]. At 31 March 2026, cash of $154 million against borrowings of $13 million leaves $141 million of net cash, and equity attributable to shareholders of $532 million [46] [47]. There is no maturity wall here and no lender who can force the issue.

Two qualifications belong next to those numbers. First, the ratio the performance highlights label "Liabilities to Equity" is 0.02, which is borrowings over equity; total liabilities of $636 million against equity of $719 million is 0.88 [48] [49]. Second, $505 million of the $573 million advances balance was classified current at end-2025, against $474 million a year earlier, while the non-current portion halved to $68 million [50]. The company is telling the reader it expects to hand over, and therefore build and deliver, substantially more within twelve months. The current ratio of 1.20 and quick ratio of 0.45 are calculated against that reclassified obligation [51]. The claim ranking ahead of shareholders is a construction obligation to buyers, not a coupon.

The company has also started buying its own shares. Between 3 February and 31 March 2026 it repurchased 11,257,600 shares for $3.4 million — an average of about $0.305 a share, against the $0.211 close on 23 July 2026 — using the OJK provision that permits buybacks without a shareholder meeting in significantly fluctuating market conditions [52].

The forward view is one analyst deep

There is effectively no consensus to lean on. One analyst submits estimates: FY2026 EPS of $0.0127 and revenue of $157 million, against FY2025 reported EPS of $0.0145. One independent data provider states outright that coverage is insufficient to forecast growth and two others carry no price target or consensus at all, and the aggregated twelve-month target of $0.767 is a single unrevised number that has not moved with a share price that has more than halved [53].

Sources: estimates, target price and broker range from the consensus summary [54]; FY2025 EPS [55]; Q1 2026 EPS annualised from $0.0054 for the quarter [56]; company target from the FY2025 marketing sales plan [57]; share price from market data as reported.

The spread inside that table is the useful part. The single aggregated estimate implies FY2026 EPS slightly below FY2025, which puts the shares on about 16.6 times forward earnings at $0.211; the March quarter alone, annualised, implies $0.0214 and about 9.8 times. Named local brokers sit between $0.196 and $0.734 — a range of nearly four times on the same company [58]. The company's own forward commitment is not an earnings number at all: a 2026 marketing sales target of $32 million [59]. Because revenue is released from a pool collected earlier, reported earnings and current order intake can diverge for years, which is precisely why the two forward anchors available point in different directions.

How this reads

On the evidence above, the earnings acceleration through 2025 and into 2026 is being funded out of the balance sheet rather than out of current trading. That is a legitimate way to run an indent-sale developer and it is fully disclosed in the primary statements; it is not a fraud pattern, and there is no lender in a position to force anything. What it does mean is that the profit line and the cash line have decoupled, and only one of them can carry on indefinitely.

The strongest fact against reading it as deterioration is timing. Handovers are lumpy, a single quarter's collections say little, and the pool at 31 March 2026 was still $509 million — more than three years of FY2025 revenue [60]. A single large collection in a later quarter would flip the sign back. The reclassification of $69 million of advances from non-current to current also suggests management expects a heavy delivery year, which mechanically front-loads recognition without implying weak demand.

Two observations would change the read. Receipts from customers recovering above recognised revenue for two consecutive quarters would say the crossover was a delivery-schedule artefact. Receipts staying near the Q1 2026 level through the half-year statements, due at the end of July 2026 [61], would put the drawdown on a footing where the pool, not the market, is setting the pace of reported earnings — and the company's own $32 million order-intake target would then be the binding constraint rather than a formality.

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Figures converted from IDR at historical FX rates — see data/company.json.fx_rates. Ratios, margins, and multiples are unitless and unchanged.

Ownership and Affiliates

The public owns exactly 10.00% of CBDK; the Kusuma and Halim families control the rest through a four-layer chain ending at PT Pantai Indah Kapuk Dua. No director or commissioner owns a share directly, there is no option or share plan, and the entire board cost $0.16 million in 2025 — billed through the parent. In the same year the company signed nine affiliated transactions worth $448 million and reported no conflict of interest in any of them.

Sources: FY2025 Annual Report, Nomination and Remuneration Policy [1]; Material Information on Investment, Expansion, Divestment, Merger and Acquisition, pp.128-143, beginning with the Company's acquisition of PT IPN under the Conditional Share Subscription Agreement [2]; Note 16 Non-Controlling Interests, difference from changes in equity of subsidiaries [3].

The control chain

CBDK sits four layers below the people who control it. PT Pantai Indah Kapuk Dua Tbk (PANI) holds 87.27%, with PT Agung Sedayu and PT Tunas Mekar Jaya each holding a further 1.37% directly and the public exactly 10.00% [4]. PANI is 84.09% owned by PT Multi Artha Pratama, which in turn is split between PT Agung Sedayu and PT Tunas Mekar Jaya; PT Agung Sedayu is held 50/50 by PT Cahaya Bintang and PT Catur Kusuma Abadi Sejahtera, and PT Catur Kusuma is held in four equal quarters by Sugianto Kusuma, Richard Halim Kusuma, Alexander Halim Kusuma and Luvena Katherine Halim [5] [6]. PT Tunas Mekar Jaya is 99.9995% owned by Hindarto Budiono [7].

Sources: FY2025 Annual Report, Shareholders Structure and Composition, pp.86-87 — PT Pantai Indah Kapuk Dua Tbk at 87.27% [8] and the ownership diagram through PT Multi Artha Pratama [9]; IPO Prospectus: PT Agung Sedayu's 50/50 holders, p.170 [10]; Hindarto Budiono's stake in PT Tunas Mekar Jaya, p.172 [11].

Multiplying the chain through, PANI's 87.27% and the two direct 1.37% blocks give the Agung Sedayu / Tunas Mekar Jaya side a look-through economic interest of roughly 76% of CBDK — 84.09% of 87.27%, plus the 2.74% held directly. The remaining 13.9 percentage points of PANI's stake belong to PANI's own minority holders. For a reader who values owner-operators, the alignment is real and large. It is also entirely indirect: the annual report states plainly that as at the end of 2025 no member of the Board of Commissioners or the Board of Directors owned any shares in the company, and that Richard Halim Kusuma, the President Commissioner, is recorded as the ultimate beneficial owner through the chain above [12]. There is no employee or management share plan of any kind [13].

The board's own affiliation table names three of the ten officers as related to the controlling shareholders: Richard Halim Kusuma (President Commissioner), Steven Kusumo (President Director) and Linda Kusumo (Director) each carry a family and a management relationship with the major shareholder [14]. One of the three commissioners is independent.

What the board is paid

Total remuneration for all three commissioners and seven directors was $0.160 million in 2025 — 0.20% of the $81.9 million of profit attributable to CBDK's owners [15] [16]. The audited note carries the same figure and classifies all of it as short-term employee benefits [17]. The March 2026 quarter ran at $0.049 million, against $0.039 million a year earlier [18].

Two qualifications matter more than the number. First, the remuneration is paid through the parent entity as a related party — it is a recharge from PANI, not a payroll line CBDK controls, and the company states that it does not disclose individual amounts [19]. Second, for 2024 and 2023 no amount was disclosed at all: the note says only that salary and other allowances for commissioners and directors were paid by a related party [20]. A CBDK shareholder can see what the group chose to recharge, not what these people earn across the group.

Sources: CBDK FY2025 Annual Report, board remuneration p.185 [21] and profit attributable to owners of the parent p.356 [22]; PT Alam Sutera Realty FY2025 Annual Report, total remuneration p.252 [23]; PT Bumi Serpong Damai FY2025 Annual Report, salaries and other short-term employee benefits p.469 [24]; PT Lippo Karawaci FY2025 Annual Report p.194, where the Dewan Komisaris total of Rp5,399,082,438 and the Direksi total of Rp75,306,600,093 are disclosed separately [25]. Peer profit attributable to owners: ASRI p.246 [26], BSDE, profit attributable to owners of the parent company, p.461 [27]; LPKR, profit for the year attributable to owners of the parent, p.108 [28]. LPKR's remuneration figure is from its governance section; the others are from audited related-party notes.

CBDK's board costs about one-twelfth of ASRI's while its parent-attributable profit is more than four times ASRI's. On the evidence available, executive pay is not a leakage channel at this company. The disclosure gap is the live issue, not the amount.

Nine transactions, one side of the table

Every material transaction CBDK executed in 2025 was with a party under the same ultimate control. There were nine, totalling $448 million — a third of the $1,355 million balance sheet [29] — and the annual report states that throughout 2025 the company did not conduct any material transaction containing elements of conflict of interest [30].

Source: FY2025 Annual Report, Material Information on Investment, Expansion, Divestment, Merger, Acquisition and Debt Restructuring, pp.128-143: the acquisition of PT IPN [31], the KML land lease [32], and the December MAS and CGIC subscriptions [33].

Six of the nine are capital injections into CBDK's own subsidiaries, so the cash stays inside the consolidated group. The two that move money out are the third item and, indirectly, the first. The lease is the more consequential: the land under NICE, the convention centre that anchors the whole $138 million MICE acquisition, is not owned by CBDK. KML — a company owned directly by PT Agung Sedayu and PT Tunas Mekar Jaya — leases it to IPN for twenty years at a rent that varies with IPN's own profit or loss [34] [35]. Whatever the convention business eventually earns, the family landlord takes a contractual share of it before CBDK's minority shareholders see anything, and the arrangement carries a stated transaction value of $94.2 million.

Six of the nine were appraised by KJPP Kusnanto and Rekan, retained by CBDK's management [36] [37]; the two June subscriptions went to a second firm, KJPP Suwendho Rinaldy and Rekan, assigned by the same management [38]; and the March purchase of CKBD was recorded as an exempt affiliated transaction, with no fairness opinion disclosed [39]. The company's stated rationale for dealing with an affiliate rather than a third party is that it "allows the implementation process to be carried out more efficiently and with competitive pricing" than an arm's-length alternative would [40]. No competing bid or market test is disclosed for any of the nine.

The subscription ladder into MAS and CGIC

The six subscriptions are where value actually crossed between CBDK's shareholders and the family. MAS is the operating heart of the group — $628 million of assets and $64 million of 2025 revenue, against CBDK's consolidated net revenues of $150 million [41] [42]. In each round CBDK subscribed for new shares that no other shareholder took up, so its stake rose and the non-controlling holders were diluted without being paid [43].

The audited note discloses, for every round, the cash CBDK paid and the book value of the interest it thereby acquired.

Source: FY2025 Annual Report, Note 15c Difference Arising from Changes in Equity of Subsidiaries — the August 2024 round, where the Company invested in MAS and CGIC, p.406 [44]; the March and June 2025 investments in MAS and CGIC, p.407 [45]; the December 2025 investments in MAS and CGIC, p.408 [46].

In March 2025 CBDK paid $18.5 million for an interest in MAS carrying $41.6 million of book value; in June it paid $19.0 million for $38.9 million [47]. The December round reversed the direction: $120.1 million for $115.1 million of book value at MAS, and $48.0 million for $45.9 million at CGIC — both roughly 4% above book [48]. Netting the six rounds, $50.7 million of book value moved out of non-controlling interests and into equity attributable to CBDK's owners during 2025 — the figure appears on both sides of the audited statements, as a credit inside additional paid-in capital and as the largest debit in the non-controlling interests roll-forward, which ends the year at $177.4 million against $226.4 million at the start [49]. Against parent equity of $541.6 million at year end [50], that is 9.4%.

The same dilution moved earnings. MAS produced $21.6 million of total comprehensive income in 2025, of which non-controlling interests were allocated $6.9 million — an implied weighted-average outside stake of 31.8%, between the 44.11% they held in January and the 22.65% they held in December [51]. Had the January stake held all year, outside holders would have taken about $9.5 million rather than $6.9 million; at the December stake they would take about $4.9 million. On MAS's 2025 result, the ladder is worth roughly $2.6 million of parent profit in 2025 and about $4.6 million a year once annualised. Total non-controlling profit across the group fell from $10.6 million to $6.2 million between 2024 and 2025 while group profit rose [52].

This ladder runs in the public shareholder's favour. The longer history does not. CBDK bought its original 51% of MAS and CGIC from the same family in August 2022 for $305.5 million and $117.0 million against book values of $153.7 million and $61.3 million [53]. Because these were common-control transactions, no goodwill was recognised; the $207.5 million excess was charged straight to equity, and the January 2025 IPN purchase added a further $0.4 million, leaving a cumulative $191.9 million debit inside additional paid-in capital [54]. Set the $67.7 million of cumulative subscription credits against it and the group's dealings with itself have left a net $124.2 million hole in CBDK's paid-in capital — 23% of parent equity. The 2022 premium was paid before the January 2025 listing, so it was borne by the family rather than by the public; what the public inherited is the depleted equity account, not the loss.

The affiliate as customer, landlord and banker

Related parties also appear on the revenue line. Sales to entities under common control were $9.9 million in 2023 (7.80% of revenue) and $23.2 million in 2024 (16.60%) — PT Sedayu Sejahtera Abadi and PT Citra Abadi Mandiri — then nil in 2025 [55] [56].

Sources: FY2024 Annual Report, Note 26 p.259, sales to PT Sedayu Sejahtera Abadi and PT Citra Abadi Mandiri [57]; FY2025 Annual Report, Note 21 p.415, where PT Sedayu Sejahtera Abadi and PT Citra Abadi Mandiri fall to nil [58].

The indent model that produces CBDK's cash-up-front economics leaves it with essentially no trade receivables from ordinary buyers — $5 thousand from third parties at the end of 2024, $0.11 million at the end of 2025 [59]. The one exception in the record is the affiliate business: at 31 December 2024, on the balance sheet CBDK carried into its listing, the only trade receivable of consequence was $13.2 million owed by two sister companies, $13.2 million of it by PT Sedayu Sejahtera Abadi [60] of it by PT Sedayu Sejahtera Abadi against the $13.8 million of revenue booked to it that year [61]. It was cleared during 2025.

Affiliates sit on the other side of the advances pool too. Of the $573 million of advances from customers, current and non-current, at the end of 2025 [62], $34.2 million came from related parties — $32.3 million of it from PT Citra Abadi Mandiri, a figure that has barely moved since 2023 [63] and stood at $30.9 million at 31 March 2026 [64] [65]. Roughly 6% of the pool from which reported profit is released was placed there by a company on the same side of the table.

The cash itself has a related-party address. $30.2 million sat at PT Bank Artha Graha Internasional and PT Bank Ina Perdana at the end of 2025 — including a $23.4 million time deposit at Artha Graha, up from $0.6 million a year earlier — while CBDK simultaneously owed Artha Graha $6.5 million [66], accounting for 41.9% of the group's finance costs [67] [68]. PANI charges a management fee for strategy, finance, marketing, human capital and accounting on an actual-cost-plus-10% basis, capped at $23.4 million a year and auto-renewing after 31 December 2026; the 2025 charge was $1.89 million, about a twelfth of the cap [69] [70].

Behind all of it runs an interest-free lending web. The prospectus lists facilities under which CBDK may lend up to $55.8 million to KML and $24.8 million to PT Kemilau Karya Utama, MAS may lend up to $58.9 million to PT Cakra Karya Semesta, and KML and PT Bumindo Mekar Wibawa may lend up to $124.0 million and $49.6 million to MAS — every one at 0% interest, none with a maturity date [71]. That web is how the pre-IPO balance sheet was assembled and partly unwound. During 2024 CBDK collected $148.7 million of receivables from related parties, advanced $84.7 million back out, and drew $63.9 million of interest-free affiliate borrowing — together about two-thirds of the $197.5 million by which cash rose that year, to the $215.7 million the company carried into its January 2025 listing [72] [73]. In 2025 $62.3 million of that affiliate borrowing was repaid, equal to 45% of the $138.1 million of IPO proceeds received in the same statement [74].

How the ledger reads

The governance question here is not whether management is extracting cash through pay — the numbers say it is not, and the family's roughly 76% look-through stake gives it every reason to want CBDK's shares to work. It is that the counterparty, the appraiser's client and the board approving the deal are the same interest, on a book where a third of the balance sheet changed hands with affiliates in a single year and no transaction in that year was classified as carrying a conflict of interest. The best evidence that the arrangement can favour minorities is the 2025 subscription ladder, which moved $51 million of book value and about $4.6 million a year of run-rate profit toward CBDK's owners. The strongest fact on the other side is that the pricing convention changed in December 2025, when the two largest rounds were struck about 4% above book rather than at a discount, and that a $94 million twenty-year lease now routes a share of the convention centre's future profit to a family company that keeps the land.

What would sharpen the read: disclosure of the appraiser's valuation basis for the December rounds, an individual breakdown of board pay across the group rather than only the recharged slice, and the rent actually paid under the KML lease once IPN turns a profit. Absent those, a shareholder is relying on the ledger staying as even-handed as it was in the first three quarters of 2025, and the balance of these transactions is set by people who own the other side.

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Figures converted from Indonesian rupiah at historical FX rates — see data/company.json.fx_rates. Ratios, margins, multiples and year-on-year percentage changes are unitless and unchanged; growth rates are computed in rupiah.

Tailwinds and Peers

Indonesia's property incentives for 2025 and 2026 cover landed houses and apartments priced up to about $300,000. Four-fifths of CBDK's 2025 order intake was bare commercial land, and residential was 0.9% of it. Three listed developers running the same year under the same policy moved between plus 3.4% and minus 22.8%; CBDK fell 79.7%. The tailwind that is genuinely CBDK's is local — PIK2 infrastructure and the NICE venue — and it has not yet reached order intake.

The tailwinds management names

CBDK's FY2025 annual report sets out an explicitly favourable backdrop. It cites Real Estate Indonesia's projection that the property sector could grow 8% in 2026, driven by the extension of the government-borne value-added tax relief on housing to 2027, falling interest rates, and the disbursement of subsidised People's Business Credit for housing [1]. It quotes broker research describing the sector outlook into 2026 as "stellar", supported by tax incentives for middle- and lower-segment housing and lower mortgage rates [1]. The macro frame is supportive too: Indonesian GDP growth of 5.11% in 2025, a policy rate held at 4.75%, and Bank Indonesia data showing national residential sales up 0.73% year on year [2].

The report's own regulatory table names the mechanism: Ministry of Finance Regulation 13/2025, which grants government-borne VAT on the transfer of landed houses and apartment units in fiscal 2025 within stated criteria and price ceilings. CBDK describes the effect on itself as potentially raising interest in buying residential property in its development area [3].

That is an accurate description of the policy. It is also a description of a policy aimed at a part of CBDK's business that barely exists.

What the incentives actually cover

The relief has a shape. Ciputra Development, one of the four listed competitors CBDK named in its own prospectus, sets it out on a single slide: VAT exemption for houses, shophouses and apartments priced up to about $300,000 per unit, exempting the VAT on the first $120,000 of value, at 100% for January to December 2026 [4]. Ciputra also discloses how much of its order intake the relief actually touches: $162 million of its $568 million of 2025 marketing sales were VAT-exempted units, or 28.6%, against 27.1% in 2024 [4].

CBDK's 2025 order intake breaks down differently. Of $25.8 million of marketing sales, $20.6 million — 79.9% — was commercial land plots, bare land that a housing VAT exemption does not reach. Commercial products, the shop-office and SOHO formats where some units could fall under the ceiling, were $5.0 million, or 19.3%. Residential was $0.2 million: 0.9% of the year's intake [5]. The single policy CBDK's own filing names as its regulatory tailwind applies most directly to the segment that produced under one per cent of what it sold.

That is not a criticism of the products. Commercial land sold in bulk to corporates is a legitimate and high-margin way to monetise a land bank. It does mean the national demand story that supports peer intake — mortgage rates, VAT relief, the three-million-homes programme, subsidised housing credit — is largely not CBDK's demand story, and a reader who takes the sector forecast as a proxy for CBDK's order book will be reading the wrong indicator.

The same year, at four other developers

The cleanest test of whether 2025 was a sector problem is what happened to the sector. Bumi Serpong Damai, Ciputra Development and Alam Sutera Realty all publish audited order intake for the same calendar year, in the same country, under the same incentive regime.

Sources: year-on-year change in marketing sales — BSDE FY2025 Annual Report [6]; CTRA FY2025 results presentation [7]; ASRI FY2025 and FY2024 Annual Reports [8] [9]; CBDK FY2025 Annual Report [5].

Bumi Serpong Damai grew presales 3.35% to $602 million and beat the $600 million target it set at the start of the year [6]. Ciputra fell 14.1%, to $568 million from $683 million, and landed at 95% of a revised target [7]. Alam Sutera fell 22.8%, from $196 million to $146 million, reaching 70% of its target [8] [9]. CBDK fell 79.7% [5].

The national picture behind those numbers is soft, not broken. Lippo Karawaci, reading the same Bank Indonesia residential survey CBDK cites, reports that the primary-market price index grew about 1% year on year in the fourth quarter of 2025 and that primary residential sales were still contracting year on year, though at a slower pace than the quarter before [10]. A flat-to-slightly-negative market is what the peer spread of plus 3.4% to minus 22.8% describes. It does not describe an 80% fall.

Sources: CBDK FY2025 Annual Report, operational highlights and target tables [5] [11] [12]; BSDE FY2025 Annual Report [6] [13]; CTRA FY2025 and Q1 2026 results presentations [7] [14]; ASRI FY2025 and FY2024 Annual Reports [8] [9]. BSDE's 2024 intake is derived from the disclosed 3.35% growth rate; CTRA's 2025 target is the revised figure the company reported against. Dollar levels are converted at each period's own rate, so percentage changes are the rupiah ones.

The read this supports: CBDK's 2025 order-intake collapse is a company-and-product event, not the Indonesian property cycle. The evidence is that three developers exposed to the same rates, the same VAT relief and the same consumer, in the same twelve months, printed intake changes an order of magnitude smaller.

The strongest fact against that read is scale. In its own prospectus CBDK put itself alongside four listed competitors, none of them close to its size.

Source: CBDK IPO prospectus, section 22.5 Persaingan Usaha, competitor financial data at 30 June 2024 [15]. Converted at the nearest available rate to 30 June 2024.

Ciputra sold 5,065 units in 2025 across projects in Greater Jakarta, Surabaya, other Java, Sumatra and Sulawesi [24]; CBDK sells sixteen products inside one district [5]. $26 million of intake is 4.5% of Ciputra's. At that scale a single large commercial land-plot transaction moves the whole year: land plots alone were $92 million of CBDK's 2024 intake and $54 million of its 2023 intake [5]. Lumpiness is a real and sufficient explanation for a large percentage swing in a small book, and the 2024 base itself included affiliate purchases that did not repeat (Ownership and Affiliates). What lumpiness does not explain is why the shortfall persisted across all three segments at once, or why the company reset its own target rather than treating the year as a timing gap (CBD PIK2 Economics).

The tailwind that is local

CBDK has a demand argument that does not depend on national housing policy, and it is the more relevant one. The company describes North Tangerang, where PIK2 sits, as one of Indonesia's largest property-growth centres, contributing roughly 17% of national demand, with NICE and the Hilton PIK2 hotel named as the catalysts enhancing the area's appeal [2]. Access is being rebuilt around it: the Kataraja toll road connects the PIK2 area to Soekarno-Hatta international airport [16], with two toll gates shown feeding the CBD directly [17].

The MICE venue is real and running. NICE completed at about 54,560 square metres with capacity for up to 100,000 visitors and began operating in August 2025 [16], partially operational from that month and expected to be fully operational in early 2026 [18]. The February 2026 presentation carries something closer to a demand signal than anything else in the filings: a booked calendar running from a Westlife gala on 10 February and a Michael Jackson production in April [19], through the Hammersonic festival, Java Jazz, and the Keramika Indonesia and Megabuild trade fairs in May and June [20], to a Kahitna anniversary concert and the Carabao International Open in September [21].

The industry backdrop for that pivot is the weakest part of the picture. Lippo Karawaci reports that average star-rated hotel occupancy fell to 47.21% in February 2025 from 49.45% a year earlier, with sector revenue down, and attributes part of the pressure to a contraction in MICE demand from the government sector after budget tightening on official travel and events [22]. CBDK is opening Indonesia's largest convention venue and a 271-room Hilton [16] into a hospitality market the nearest listed operator describes as contracting. A booked calendar of concerts and trade fairs is a corporate and consumer revenue base rather than a government one, which is the right side of that particular squeeze — but no filing in the corpus discloses attendance, hall utilisation, or the rate NICE charges, so the calendar is evidence of activity and not yet evidence of economics.

What the 2026 plan requires

The 2026 target makes the demand question concrete. CBDK is guiding to $33.8 million of marketing sales, 30.9% above 2025 realisation. The composition matters more than the total.

Source: CBDK FY2025 Annual Report, comparison of 2025 realization with 2026 projections [12].

Commercial land plots are targeted 6.0% higher and commercial products 2.5% higher. Residential is targeted at $6.8 million against $0.2 million realised — thirty-one times the 2025 outcome, and 83% of the entire planned increase in order intake [12]. Residential was also the segment that missed hardest in 2025, delivering 36.76% of a $0.6 million target [11].

Read alongside the peers, that is an unusual plan. Bumi Serpong Damai left its 2026 target unchanged at $600 million, describing it as a moderate view of demand [13]. Ciputra set $569 million, 0.3% above 2025, and booked $147 million in the March quarter against $196 million a year earlier [14]. Alam Sutera guided to $168 million, 14.8% above a year in which it hit 70% of plan [8]. CBDK is guiding to the largest percentage increase in the group, concentrated in the segment where it has the least commercial history and the weakest 2025 record — and it is the only one of the four that publishes no quarterly order-intake figure against which a reader could mark that plan to market.

One disclosure detail belongs with the numbers. The English narrative on page 121 attributes the 95.08% achievement to residential, 60.68% to commercial land plots and 36.76% to commercial products; the Indonesian text on the same page and the target table on page 120 both assign 95.08% to commercial land plots, 60.68% to commercial products and 36.76% to residential [11] [12]. The tables govern. An English-language reader relying on the narrative would conclude that residential was the year's strongest segment when it was the weakest, and would misjudge the 2026 plan accordingly.

What would change the read

Three observable things would move this assessment materially. A half-year or full-year 2026 intake print showing commercial land plots back at the $19–25 million pace of 2024 would convert 2025 into a timing gap rather than a demand break. Residential intake tracking anywhere near the $6.8 million target through 2026 would show the new segment is being built rather than assumed. And any disclosure of NICE utilisation, event revenue or hall rates would let the recurring-income pivot be judged on economics instead of a booking calendar.

Against that, the prospectus itself flags what would push the other way: CBDK identifies weakening consumer purchasing power as the principal risk to its business continuity, and competition for the same middle- and upper-income buyer as its main business risk [23]. Those are the risks the whole listed peer group carries. On the evidence of 2025, they are not what separated CBDK from it.