Chapter 8

Backlog Run-Off

Figures converted from Indonesian rupiah at historical FX rates — see data/company.json.fx_rates. Ratios, margins, and multiples are unitless and unchanged.

At 31 March 2026 CBDK held $508.6 million of customer money against product not yet handed over [1] — about 3.1 years of revenue at the March-quarter rate, against 4.5 years at the end of 2023. New orders replaced 17% of the revenue recognised in 2025, against 94% in 2024 [2]. Stripping net cash and the profit still to come out of that pool leaves a residual that values everything unsold at 0.8 to 1.1 times its historic cost.

Sources: advances [3]; order intake [4]; cash and bank loans [5] [6]; coverage and replacement rate derived.

What the pool has to cover

CBDK sells before it builds. Cash arrives on contract, sits on the balance sheet as advances from customers, and becomes revenue only when the buyer takes handover [7]. That pool stood at $508.6 million at 31 March 2026: $474.7 million owed to third-party buyers, $32.8 million to related parties, and $1.1 million of rental prepayments and unallocated deposits [8].

The pool is the company's stock of already-funded revenue. Set against the revenue actually recognised, it has been shrinking as a multiple for two years.

Sources: advances from customers at 31 December 2023 [9], at 31 December 2024 and 2025 [10], and at 31 March 2026 [11]; FY2023 revenue [12]; FY2024 and FY2025 revenue [13]; Q1 2026 revenue [14]; order intake [15]. Coverage years are derived.

Two things moved at once. Revenue rose 28% across the three years, from $127.0 million to $150.2 million [16] [17], and the pool stopped growing: up $76.8 million in 2024, down $23.4 million in 2025, down a further $26.1 million in the March 2026 quarter alone [18] [19].

The March quarter shows the mechanism cleanly. CBDK recognised $41.6 million of revenue [20] while collecting $15.6 million from customers [21] — a gap of $26.0 million against a $26.1 million fall in the pool. The two figures agree to within 0.3%, which is what makes the pool usable as an arithmetic quantity rather than a metaphor: at CBDK, revenue is very nearly the pool being drawn down.

The replacement rate

Order intake — what the company calls marketing sales — is the only thing that refills the pool. Against revenue recognised, it collapsed in 2025.

Sources: order intake 2023–2025 [22]; 2026 intake target of $31.5 million [23]; revenue [24] [25]. The FY2026 revenue bar is the single published analyst estimate, not company guidance.

In 2023 the company sold $1.15 of new product for every $1.00 it handed over; in 2024, $0.94; in 2025, $0.17 [26]. Management's own 2026 target of $31.5 million does not aim at replacement either [27]: it is 20% of the only published revenue estimate for the year. On the company's own plan, the pool keeps draining.

CBDK does not disclose quarterly intake, so there is no mark on 2026 between the December year end and the half-year statements. It is the largest gap in this arithmetic, and it closes shortly.

What is already paid for

The useful consequence of a pre-sold model is that a large slice of future profit is not a forecast — it is a delivery obligation against cash already banked. $507.5 million of the pool is sales advances on land plots, houses, shop-offices and warehouses [28]. Handing that product over converts it to revenue at whatever margin the mix carries.

Two margins bracket the plausible range. The FY2025 real estate segment earned 67.4% on $147.9 million of revenue against $48.2 million of released inventory cost [29]. The March 2026 quarter earned 88.2% on $41.3 million against $4.9 million [30] — a released cost that reads as bare land, the highest-margin product in the book. FY2025's mix is the more representative case; the March quarter is an upper bound.

Sources: advances [31]; segment margins [32] [33]; below-gross costs and the parent share held at FY2025 ratios [34] [35]. Derived arithmetic, undiscounted.

Selling and administrative expense, final tax and income tax together consumed 15.4% of FY2025 revenue — $13.3 million, $6.9 million and $2.9 million respectively [36]. Parent shareholders took 93.0% of group profit in FY2025 [37] — a conservative anchor, since the March quarter's split was 99.1%. On those ratios, delivering what has already been paid for leaves $245.4 million to $343.5 million for CBDK's own shareholders, spread over roughly three to four years and not discounted here.

Setting that against the market value gives a decomposition rather than a valuation:

Sources: shares outstanding of 5,657,686,900 after 11,257,600 held in treasury [38]; cash and bank loans [39]; assets [40]. Share price as reported on the Indonesia Stock Exchange; the rest is derived.

Net cash is cash and equivalents of $153.7 million less bank loans of $13.1 million [41] [42]. The remaining book is what survives the run-off: inventories of $782.7 million less the cost released, plus investment property of $141.7 million, fixed assets of $27.8 million, other investments of $84.5 million and prepaid taxes of $57.1 million, plus $8.5 million of time deposits, receivables and prepayments, less $36.3 million of payables, accruals and employee benefit obligations and less $165.8 million attributable to non-controlling interests [43] [44] [45].

The residual divided by the remaining book gives 1.10 times at the FY2025 margin and 0.84 times at the March-quarter margin. On the stated assumptions, then, once cash and pre-sold profit are taken out, the market pays roughly one times historic cost for CBDK's undeveloped land, its convention centre and its hotel. That is a narrower premium than the headline price-to-book multiple of 2.24 times, which measures the $1,191.3 million market value against $532.4 million of parent equity [46], and it sits alongside rather than replaces the per-square-metre work in Land at Cost. Three caveats belong with it. The run-off profit is undiscounted and takes years to arrive. Below-gross costs are held at FY2025's ratio, when general and administrative expense would not fall proportionately in a genuine wind-down. And historic cost is a cost, not a market value: nothing in the corpus marks this land to a transaction.

Three intake paths

Over a long enough horizon revenue cannot exceed intake. The table below runs CBDK's own FY2025 cost structure at three sustained intake levels: gross margin at 67.4%, selling expense at 2.2% of revenue, general and administrative expense fixed at $10.0 million, associate losses at $1.7 million, net finance income at $13.7 million, final tax at 4.6% of revenue and income tax at $2.9 million [47]. Applied to FY2025's actual revenue the model returns $90.2 million against $88.0 million reported — 2.4% high, which is the accuracy the table carries.

Source: derived from the FY2025 cost structure [48] and FY2025 reported EPS of $0.0135 [49]; intake levels [50] [51].

The price is most sensitive to which of those paths holds. At intake sustained near where it ran in 2025 and where management has targeted 2026, the earnings currently being capitalised are roughly five times the earnings the order book would support, and the multiple on that steady state is between 70 and 93 times. At intake back near the 2023–24 average, current earnings are close to sustainable and the multiple is 17.5 times. The pool buys three to four years to find out which it is.

Two facts cut hard against reading the low path as the likely one. First, intake at CBDK is lumpy by construction: commercial land plots were $92.3 million of 2024's $131.1 million, and $20.6 million of 2025's $25.8 million [52]. A single corporate buyer can restore a year's intake — the two customer sales recognised in the March 2026 quarter alone produced $29.0 million of revenue [53], more than the whole of 2025's order book (Customer Concentration). Second, the pool is not the asset. Delivering everything already collected releases only about $165.4 million of the $782.7 million inventory book at FY2025 margins — roughly a fifth [54]. $391.3 million of undeveloped land and $307.7 million of land under development would still be there [55]. A land bank does not have to sell on schedule; it has to sell eventually.

The read the evidence supports is that the low path is a floor on reported earnings power rather than a forecast, and that the residual multiple of 0.84 to 1.10 times cost is the more durable anchor than any near-term P/E. What would move it: an intake print near or above $56 million for the first half of 2026 would put the replacement rate back in a range where current revenue is defensible; a first half near $11 million would confirm the $31.5 million full-year target as the ceiling rather than the base.

Where the balance sheet can and cannot break

CBDK's liabilities are almost entirely a promise to build, not a promise to repay. Of $557.9 million of total liabilities at 31 March 2026, $508.6 million — 91.2% — is advances from customers, and bank loans are $13.1 million against $153.7 million of cash [56] [57]. Trade payables, other payables, taxes, accruals and employee benefit obligations total about $36.3 million — a quarter of the cash balance. On the filed record there is no maturity wall and no lender able to force the issue; the solvency detail sits in Financials and Estimates.

The constraint is slower and runs through cash. Free cash flow — operating cash flow less purchases of fixed assets and investment properties — was minus $35.5 million in FY2025, on $43.2 million of operating cash flow against $78.7 million of capital spending [58], and minus $14.4 million in the March 2026 quarter, on minus $7.3 million of operating cash flow and $7.1 million of capital spending [59]. At the FY2025 rate the cash balance funds about four and a half more years; at the March-quarter rate, about two and a half. Neither is a near-term insolvency risk, and the repurchase of 11,257,600 shares for $3.4 million in the March quarter, under a programme running from 3 February to 2 May 2026 [60], indicates management does not treat the balance sheet as tight. The burn is nonetheless real, and it runs against a pool that is no longer being refilled.

What the next filings settle

The half-year 2026 statements are due at the Indonesia Stock Exchange at the end of July 2026, with the earnings calendar carrying 29 July 2026. Four line items in that filing are checkable against thresholds this chapter has set.

The fourth of those is the cleanest test in the set, because the amount is exact to the rupiah in the filing: $15.1 million is the figure the March 2026 note attributes to PT Global Jet Express [61], and the same figure appears in the nine-month 2025 note but not in the audited FY2025 one (Customer Concentration).

Beyond that filing, the FY2026 annual report — due around April 2027 — carries the target-versus-realisation table for 2026 and the 2027 target, which is where management's own view of the replacement rate becomes visible again.

Three things this chapter could not resolve. There is no external mark on the land: no appraisal, transacted price per square metre or broker valuation for the CBD PIK2 district exists anywhere in the corpus, so the remaining book is priced against its own cost. There is no buyer-level breakdown of the $508.6 million pool beyond the $32.8 million owed to related parties [62], so the concentration of the run-off is unknown. And no 2026 broker commentary or half-year press reporting was available to bring against the filed record.