Chapter 5

Figures converted from Indonesian rupiah at historical FX rates — see data/company.json.fx_rates. Ratios, margins, and multiples are unitless and unchanged.

The asset behind the earnings

CBDK's inventory was $782.7 million at 31 March 2026 — 62% of total assets [1] — and it is carried at what the land cost, not what it is worth [2]. Across roughly 7.0 million square metres that is about $111.5 per square metre. Sales have realised 2.0 to 3.1 times that cost over three years, the same band two listed peers realised in 2025, and the current price pays about 1.84 times cost.

Sources: FY2024 Annual Report, Note 10 Inventories [3]; FY2025 Annual Report, Note 6 Inventories [4]; Q1 2026 interim statements, Note 6 [5].

Half the book sits in a single non-current line. Undeveloped land was $391.3 million at 31 March 2026, 50% of inventory, against $415.7 million two years earlier [6] [7]. The stock of finished product — land and buildings ready for sale — moves in a much narrower band, between nil and $64.6 million, so at any moment the company holds under 9% of its inventory in a form a buyer can complete on.

The carrying value

The company discloses the area behind that money in the inventory note, and repeats it with a three-year history in the sustainability section. At 31 December 2025 it held 3,678,961 square metres of HGB-titled land ready for sale or under development and 3,341,874 square metres of undeveloped land, 7,020,835 in total [8]. That is the 702-hectare reserve, and the two-year change in it is small: 7,375,908 square metres at the end of 2023, 6,982,544 at the end of 2024, 7,020,835 at the end of 2025.

Sources: inventory from the FY2024 and FY2025 annual reports, Notes 10 and 6 [9] [10]; area from the FY2025 sustainability overview [11]; per-square-metre figures derived.

Blended carrying cost rose 8.4% over two years, from $118.0 to $118.1 per square metre, on an area that barely moved. That is not price appreciation — inventory is held at the lower of cost and net realisable value, and cost accumulates as predevelopment work, infrastructure, capitalised borrowing and construction go into the ground [12]. Development spending, not the market, is what moves this number.

Two features of the accounting matter for anything built on it. Cost is released to the income statement by the land-areal method, so what leaves inventory on a sale is an allocated average for the precinct, not the price paid for that specific plot [13]. And in every year of the record, including the March 2026 interim, management states that no provision for impairment is required and that no inventory is pledged as collateral [14] [15]. On a cost basis that assertion is undemanding, as the next section shows. It also means no lender has independently valued the land, because no lender has taken security over it.

The land sits across five entities. The May 2025 investor presentation maps it: PT Mega Andalan Sukses holds 413 hectares, PT Cahaya Gemilang Indah Cemerlang 123, CBDK itself 155, the NICE exhibition site 19, and PT Cahaya Kencana Indah 8 [16]. MAS alone is 59% of the reserve, and it is the subsidiary whose minority interests CBDK bought down through 2025 (Ownership and Affiliates).

What the land has realised

The cleanest test of the carrying value is the record itself: how much revenue each dollar of released inventory cost has produced.

Sources: FY2023 revenue and gross profit from the FY2025 sustainability overview [17]; FY2024 from the consolidated income statement [18]; FY2025 real estate segment [19]; Q1 2026 real estate segment [20].

In FY2023, $62.8 million of inventory cost produced $127.0 million of revenue [21]. In FY2024, $60.6 million produced $139.4 million [22]. In FY2025 the real estate segment turned $48.2 million of cost into $147.9 million of revenue, a 67.4% gross margin [23]. In the March 2026 quarter it turned $4.9 million into $41.3 million, a multiple of 8.5 and an 88.2% margin [24].

The direction of that series is mix, not pricing power. In FY2024 the company released $55.4 million of buildings under construction into finished stock; in FY2025 it released $11.9 million [25]. Built product carries construction cost; bare land plots carry almost none. As the mix moved from houses and shop-offices to land, the multiple on cost rose mechanically. The March 2026 quarter is the extreme case: two corporate buyers, PT Global Jet Express and PT Erajaya Swasembada, accounted for $29.0 million, or 70% of quarterly revenue, against inventory cost of $4.9 million for the whole segment [26].

Set against peers, the FY2025 outcome is unremarkable. Bumi Serpong Damai's real estate segment turned $245.5 million of cost into $709.8 million of revenue in 2025 — 2.89 times, a 65.4% margin [27]. Alam Sutera Realty's property development segment ran 2.87 times and 65.2% [28].

Sources: CBDK FY2025 segment note [29]; BSDE FY2025 segment information [30]; ASRI FY2025 segment information [31].

A 66% gross margin is what an Indonesian township developer earns when it sells land it has held at cost. It is a feature of the accounting model and the industry, not a signal that CBDK's land is unusually cheap.

The peer cost base

Where CBDK does differ from both peers is the level of the cost itself.

Sources: CBDK undeveloped land and area [32]; ASRI land for development [33] and area [34]; BSDE land for development [35]; per-square-metre figures derived.

CBDK carries raw land at 3.7 times ASRI's book cost and 5.0 times BSDE's, and ASRI's land bank is itself concentrated in Tangerang — $344.8 million in Pinang and $286.1 million in Pasar Kemis, 96% of its total [36]. Two things sit behind the gap. PIK2's coastal CBD land is genuinely more valuable per square metre than inland Pasar Kemis or a thirty-year-old Serpong parcel. And CBDK's cost base is recent: BSDE and ASRI assembled theirs across decades of much lower nominal prices, which is why their books show so little of what the land is now worth.

For an investor whose case rests on assets carried below their value, that cuts both ways. CBDK's book is closer to current cost than a peer's, so it embeds less hidden appreciation — but it is also a book that has been marked by recent spending rather than by 1990s land prices, which makes it a more current, and in that narrow sense more reliable, floor.

What the price implies per square metre

Sources: inventory and area per the Q1 2026 interim statements and the FY2025 sustainability overview [37] [38]; equity and share count from the Q1 2026 balance sheet and Note 14 [39] [40]; realisation multiple from the FY2025 segment note [41]; share price as reported by the exchange, 23 July 2026.

The arithmetic is simple enough to check. At $0.21 on 23 July 2026, and 5,657,686,900 shares outstanding after the 11,257,600 held in treasury [42], the market values the equity at $1,191.3 million. Equity attributable to owners of the parent was $532.4 million at 31 March 2026 [43]. The premium is $659.0 million. Spread over 7.0 million square metres, and holding every other asset and liability at book, that premium is $93.9 per square metre on top of the $111.5 already carried — an implied land value of about $205.3 per square metre, or 1.84 times cost.

The FY2025 realisation multiple of 3.07 times, applied to the same book, implies about $341.8 per square metre of gross revenue. The distance between $205.3 and $341.8 is the room the case has, and four things have to fit inside it: selling and administrative expense, which ran $13.3 million in FY2025, or 8.9% of revenue [44]; final tax of $6.9 million, 4.6% of revenue [45]; the development spending still to be sunk into 3.3 million square metres of raw land; and time.

Sources: derived from inventory and equity in the Q1 2026 interim statements [46] [47], area from the FY2025 sustainability overview [48], and the cost of revenue released in FY2025 [49].

Time is the constraint that does the work. At FY2025's $45.0 million of inventory cost released, the $782.7 million book is 17.4 years of sales. At the three-year average of $51.3 million, 15.3 years. At the March 2026 quarter's rate annualised, 40 years. Discounted over any of those horizons, the $341.8 of undiscounted gross revenue per square metre shrinks toward — and at the slower paces through — the $205.3 the price already assumes. The asset backing is real and it is large; what it is not is quick.

My read is that the land is worth more than book and that the current price is not obviously wrong about how much more — roughly a doubling of cost, against a record that says 2 to 3 times cost gross. What makes that reassuring rather than compelling is the release rate. The strongest fact against a bearish reading of it is that the book is still growing, not draining: inventory rose from $773.9 million to $782.7 million during the March 2026 quarter, with $10.4 million added to undeveloped land alone [50]. A company consuming its land bank would show the opposite. What would change the read in the other direction is a sustained rise in the realisation multiple on ordinary sales — not on quarters carried by two corporate buyers — or the first disclosure of a realised price per square metre against which $111.5 of cost can be marked.

What the filings do not disclose

The corpus contains no valuation of this land. The KJPP fairness opinions that appear in the FY2025 report cover affiliated transactions, not the inventory. The one internal mark that touches PIK2 land directly is the 21 March 2025 lease of the 187,740-square-metre NICE site from PT Kukuh Mandiri Lestari, a party under common control, disclosed at a transaction value of $97.3 million for twenty years [51] — about $518.5 per square metre of leasehold [52]. The rent is variable with the tenant's own profit or loss, the counterparty is the family, and a twenty-year lease is not a freehold price, so the number bounds nothing. It is worth stating only because it is the sole PIK2 land figure in the corpus set by a transaction rather than by accumulated cost.

Three further gaps are worth naming plainly:

No filing discloses the title status of the undeveloped half of the book. The inventory note describes 3,678,961 square metres of ready-for-sale and under-development land as HGB-titled; it says nothing about the 3,341,874 square metres of undeveloped land [53]. ASRI, by contrast, discloses that 10,911,378 of its 19,305,394 square metres are titled in the group's name and that the remainder sits on release letters or binding sale agreements pending gradual HGB conversion [54]. Silence is not evidence of a defect; it is an absence a reader should price as an unknown rather than as a confirmed HGB title.

No filing discloses a realised price per square metre, or the area handed over in any period. The multiple on cost is computable; the price is not.

And the area disclosure has been wrong at least once. The 31 March 2025 interim reported HGB-titled saleable land of 11,560,975 square metres [55], against 3,656,578 at the previous year end and 3,534,172 three months later [56]. The figure was corrected in the following quarter without comment. The dollar balances in the same note reconcile across every period, so the error is confined to the area disclosure — but the area disclosure is the denominator of every per-square-metre figure on this page, including the company's own.