Chapter 2

Figures converted from Indonesian rupiah at historical FX rates — see data/company.json.fx_rates. Ratios, margins, and multiples are unitless and unchanged.

Bottom line

CBDK's cash flow statement crossed over in 2025. Cash received from customers fell to $140 million from $203 million while recognised revenue rose to $150 million [1] — the first year the company booked more revenue than it collected [2]. In the March 2026 quarter the gap widened and operating cash flow turned negative, at minus $7 million against $31 million of reported profit [3].

Cash in, revenue out

The reported profit and loss account for 2023 to 2025 is a clean upward line, and the orientation chapter sets it out. The cash flow statement tells a different story, and it is the more informative of the two for a business that collects money years before it recognises revenue.

Because CBDK sells on an indent basis, the cash flow line "receipt from customers" is close to a direct measure of commercial activity in the period: it is money physically arriving from buyers, whether against a plot sold last month or an instalment on one sold three years ago. Recognised revenue, by contrast, is the release of earlier collections onto the income statement when a unit is handed over. The difference between the two is the direction the advances pool is travelling.

Sources: FY2025 receipts and the FY2024 restated comparative from the FY2025 consolidated cash flow statement [4]; FY2023 receipts from the audited FY2023 statements [5]; revenue from the FY2025 Financial Highlights [6].

In 2023 the company took in $75 million more from customers than it recognised. In 2024, $64 million more. In 2025 the sign flipped: $11 million less [7] [8] [9]. The balance sheet agrees: advances from customers fell to $573 million at end-2025 from $616 million a year earlier [10].

The March 2026 quarter extends the trend rather than breaking it. Revenue of $42 million was 74% higher year on year and gross profit rose 159% [11], and profit attributable to shareholders rose to $30 million from $8 million, an EPS of $0.0054 against $0.0014 [12]. Cash received from customers in the same three months was $16 million, down from $51 million a year earlier [13]. The $26 million shortfall against recognised revenue is almost exactly the $26 million by which the advances pool shrank in the quarter, to $509 million [14]. The two statements are describing the same event from opposite sides.

Profit converted to cash

Source: derived from operating cash flow of $62.8M, $107.3M and $43.2M and profit for the year of $52.3M, $67.9M and $88.0M, FY2023–FY2025 [15] [16], and from Q1 2026 operating cash flow of minus $7.3M against profit of $30.6M [17] [18].

For two years operating cash flow ran ahead of accounting profit — 120% of it in 2023, 158% in 2024. In 2025 it covered 49%. In the March 2026 quarter it covered none of it [19] [20]. That pattern is what a pre-collected order book looks like when it is being drawn down faster than it is being refilled; it is not, on this evidence, a receivables or a working-capital problem, since CBDK carries almost no trade receivables at all [21].

Sources: FY2024 and FY2025 from the consolidated cash flow statement [22] and the three-year summary [23]; FY2023 from the audited FY2023 statements [24]; Q1 2026 from the interim statements [25].

One comparability note the table cannot show. The FY2024 column was restated during 2025 when CBDK acquired PT Industri Pameran Nusantara from an entity under common control and applied pooling-of-interests accounting, which the auditor flagged in an emphasis-of-matter paragraph [26]. The restatement added $74 million to end-2024 total assets, matched almost exactly by additional liabilities of $74 million, and left revenue and earnings per share unchanged [27]. The FY2023 column was not restated — the visible tell is that closing cash for 2023 is $18.7 million while opening cash for 2024 is $19.1 million, the $0.4 million difference being the acquired entity's cash [28].

Management's explanation

The FY2025 management discussion attributes the 58.43% fall in operating cash flow to one cause: an increase in payments to suppliers of $13.7 million, or 17.59% [29]. That figure is accurate and it is the right sign, but it accounts for roughly a fifth of the decline. Cash generated from operations before interest and tax fell $72 million, from $109 million to $38 million, and $57 million of that — four-fifths — came from the drop in receipts from customers, which the cash flow discussion does not mention [30] [31]. The number a reader needs is in the statements; it is not in the narrative that explains them.

Where the money went

Cash fell $21 million during 2025 even after $138 million of IPO proceeds arrived, because $127 million went out through investing [32] [33]. Against the property spend, 2025 was the first year of negative free cash flow in the record: $43 million of operating cash flow, less $69 million of investment-property purchases and $10 million of fixed assets, is minus $36 million. The March quarter added another minus $14 million on the same basis [34] [35].

Most of that spending is the MICE and hospitality build-out: investment property additions of $103 million in 2025, with the entire $155 million of assets under construction transferred into completed buildings during the year, taking net investment property to $154 million [36]. One item is different in kind. On 21 October 2025 CBDK placed $51 million, in two equal tranches, into long-term bonds issued by PT Danantara Investment Management (Persero), described in the notes as "Patriot Bond" Series A and Series B, carrying interest of 2% per annum and maturing in October 2030 and October 2032 [37]. That is 37% of net IPO proceeds committed for five and seven years at 2%, by a company whose own bank facilities cost between 6.50% and 9.00% [38]. The bonds are carried at amortised cost equal to nominal value, and the fair-value note states that the fair value of the Group's financial assets approximates carrying value "as the effect of discounting is not material" — a statement that now covers a five-to-seven-year instrument yielding a third of what the company pays its own banks [39] [40]. Discounted at 6.5% — the lowest rate CBDK itself pays, and so the most generous assumption available from its own filings — the two tranches are worth in the region of $40 million rather than $51 million. That is my arithmetic, not a company disclosure; the filings offer no separate valuation of the instrument.

A second, quieter drain sits in current assets. Prepaid taxes reached $61 million at end-2025, from $54 million and $46 million in the two prior years, of which $46 million is unrecovered value-added tax [41]. At 31 March 2026 the balance was $57 million [42]. That is cash already paid to the tax authority, equal to 69% of FY2025 group profit, sitting on the balance sheet pending refund or offset, and it has grown every year in the record.

Whose profit it is

Group profit and profit attributable to shareholders have moved at different speeds, and the gap is not small. Between 2023 and 2025 profit for the year rose $40 million, from $52 million to $88 million. Profit attributable to owners of the parent rose $47 million, from $38 million to $82 million, because the parent's share of group profit went from 71.9% to 93.0% as non-controlling interests fell from $15 million to $6 million [43]. Held at the 2023 share, FY2025 profit to shareholders would have been about $63 million. On that arithmetic roughly $19 million — 39% of the two-year increase in shareholder profit, and $0.0033 of the $0.0071 increase in EPS — came from owning more of the same group rather than from the group earning more. What CBDK paid the sellers, and to whom, is a separate question the filings answer only in part; it belongs in a chapter of its own.

What "net cash" does and does not cover

For a reader whose first screen is solvency, the headline numbers are reassuring and mostly earned. Borrowings were $15 million at end-2025 against $187 million of cash, so net cash of $172 million and a gearing ratio the company reports as nil [44]. Interest cover is 50 times, and management states plainly that as of end-2025 no financial-ratio covenants applied under any of its loan agreements [45]. At 31 March 2026, cash of $154 million against borrowings of $13 million leaves $141 million of net cash, and equity attributable to shareholders of $532 million [46] [47]. There is no maturity wall here and no lender who can force the issue.

Two qualifications belong next to those numbers. First, the ratio the performance highlights label "Liabilities to Equity" is 0.02, which is borrowings over equity; total liabilities of $636 million against equity of $719 million is 0.88 [48] [49]. Second, $505 million of the $573 million advances balance was classified current at end-2025, against $474 million a year earlier, while the non-current portion halved to $68 million [50]. The company is telling the reader it expects to hand over, and therefore build and deliver, substantially more within twelve months. The current ratio of 1.20 and quick ratio of 0.45 are calculated against that reclassified obligation [51]. The claim ranking ahead of shareholders is a construction obligation to buyers, not a coupon.

The company has also started buying its own shares. Between 3 February and 31 March 2026 it repurchased 11,257,600 shares for $3.4 million — an average of about $0.305 a share, against the $0.211 close on 23 July 2026 — using the OJK provision that permits buybacks without a shareholder meeting in significantly fluctuating market conditions [52].

The forward view is one analyst deep

There is effectively no consensus to lean on. One analyst submits estimates: FY2026 EPS of $0.0127 and revenue of $157 million, against FY2025 reported EPS of $0.0145. One independent data provider states outright that coverage is insufficient to forecast growth and two others carry no price target or consensus at all, and the aggregated twelve-month target of $0.767 is a single unrevised number that has not moved with a share price that has more than halved [53].

Sources: estimates, target price and broker range from the consensus summary [54]; FY2025 EPS [55]; Q1 2026 EPS annualised from $0.0054 for the quarter [56]; company target from the FY2025 marketing sales plan [57]; share price from market data as reported.

The spread inside that table is the useful part. The single aggregated estimate implies FY2026 EPS slightly below FY2025, which puts the shares on about 16.6 times forward earnings at $0.211; the March quarter alone, annualised, implies $0.0214 and about 9.8 times. Named local brokers sit between $0.196 and $0.734 — a range of nearly four times on the same company [58]. The company's own forward commitment is not an earnings number at all: a 2026 marketing sales target of $32 million [59]. Because revenue is released from a pool collected earlier, reported earnings and current order intake can diverge for years, which is precisely why the two forward anchors available point in different directions.

How this reads

On the evidence above, the earnings acceleration through 2025 and into 2026 is being funded out of the balance sheet rather than out of current trading. That is a legitimate way to run an indent-sale developer and it is fully disclosed in the primary statements; it is not a fraud pattern, and there is no lender in a position to force anything. What it does mean is that the profit line and the cash line have decoupled, and only one of them can carry on indefinitely.

The strongest fact against reading it as deterioration is timing. Handovers are lumpy, a single quarter's collections say little, and the pool at 31 March 2026 was still $509 million — more than three years of FY2025 revenue [60]. A single large collection in a later quarter would flip the sign back. The reclassification of $69 million of advances from non-current to current also suggests management expects a heavy delivery year, which mechanically front-loads recognition without implying weak demand.

Two observations would change the read. Receipts from customers recovering above recognised revenue for two consecutive quarters would say the crossover was a delivery-schedule artefact. Receipts staying near the Q1 2026 level through the half-year statements, due at the end of July 2026 [61], would put the drawdown on a footing where the pool, not the market, is setting the pace of reported earnings — and the company's own $32 million order-intake target would then be the binding constraint rather than a formality.